How could producers deal with this potential supply disaster? Soon the economic implications were recognised, as Frederick Boyle said as early as 1872: "You cannot drown the market with an article only appertaining to the highest luxury… without swift and sudden catastrophe. These things require the most delicate manipulation… they need a hand to hold them back or loose them as occasion asks." 3 This statement already contained all the elements of the crucial structure of the diamond market: the diamond was identified as a pure luxury good and not appropriate for being traded on a normal market. 4 It might be considered consistent with the "spirit of the age" that a manipulation of the supply-side of the market was suggested in order to protect the market from a disastrous collapse, but a sophisticated analysis of the diamond market will create the same suggestion: this market has to be run by a strong monopoly or, perhaps, by a stable cartel which can act in the same way as a monopolist supplier. The essence of the monopolist's strategy is simple: in economic downturns diamonds must be held back to support prices and in bullish markets more stones must be released to bind excess cash.
Following this economic concept, the gemstone diamond market expanded during the last century, strongly controlled by the De Beers company, which had organised a cartel to act like a monopolist in the worldwide diamond market. But the paper shows that this expansion will come to a sudden end at a yet unknown point in the future because the existence of the monopoly is based on a fundamental paradox: The problem of the monopolisticly organised supply is, however, not the stability of the cartel or the diamond producers which belong to it. Any problem caused by an action of an external producer could be controlled by the common interest of a stable market and rising prices. The central problem is in fact the economic success of the monopoly which sold millions of carat of the extremely durable commodity "diamond" . If those buyers open any functioning secondary market in order to capitalise on the rising prices offered by the "official" gemstone market, it is possible that there will be a run on selling diamonds, causing prices to plummet to a low competition equilibrium. Thus, the high price of the luxury good will be shown to be an illusion in terms of its value, and the commodity will be shown to be a mundane one. Veblen (1899) concluded that price was the most relevant attribute of jewels 5 which were purchased because they were expensive and not because they were cheap. 6 According to Veblen, any purchase of luxury goods by an individual is not determined by the isolated use provided by the good itself to the buyer. On the contrary, the purchase of this good is designed to give a strong signal to other individuals that the buyer is wealthy enough to buy and display such an apparently "useless" but expensive luxury good. The driving forces behind this behaviour are an inter-individual comparison and the individual's own satisfaction at other people's jealousy of the wealth and the social status represented by conspicuous consumption.
The Anomaly of the Commodity "Diamond"
7 Therefore, the demand for luxury goods for conspicuous consumption is a phenomenon of socially interdependent demand functions. Thus, economists can not use a simple aggregation of pure individual demand functions to show an increased market demand. Veblen's aggregation of 5 Veblen, T. (1899) . 6 Lenzen, G. (1966), p. 194. 7 Veblen, T. (1899) .
.
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A Simple Microeconomic Model Illustrating Rising Diamond Prices and the Durable Goods Problem individual demand functions referring to conspicuous goods shows an upward sloping aggregated demand curve: Leibenstein H. (1950) , p.202. Additionally, some individuals prefer to imitate the hordes of like-minded people. Their decisions in regard to the consumption of and demand for goods follow a "bandwagon" effect, defined by social interaction which is linked to the quantities of a commodity consumed by a social class. If any variation in the price of the good is assumed to be relevant, the typical bandwagon effect creates an aggregated demand curve as follows: Leibenstein H. (1950), p.195 . If a lot of individuals are already consuming a specific good, it follows that more individuals would also like to consume this good -without looking at the (nominal) price of the good. 8 In this case, the demand curve is a parallel line to the quantity axis for any price fixed externally. The result of a downward sloping curve for a bandwagon effect can be explained by growing wealth within a society. If wealth, measured in terms of real wealth after adjustment for any inflationary effects, grows faster than the nominal price of diamonds, the same shape of the demand curve is the result. Now, the real price of diamonds decreases in comparison with the growth of real wealth. This has the consequence that many more people can purchase a diamond, which seems cheap in comparison to their growing income and wealth. The bandwagon effect seems to stand in contradiction to the Veblen-effect in a static analysis, but two aspects are able to unite both effects in a dynamic analysis: the first aspect is provided by the bandwagon effect of joining the horde of those individuals who already practise conspicuous consumption of a specific luxury good, e.g. gemstone diamonds. After someone has been incorporated into the social group which he has been able to join by purchasing the specific luxury good for conspicuous consumption, the "new member of this class" tries to effect an upgrade of his social status within this class by purchasing the same good, but a more expensive model, bigger and of better quality. Thus, the consumer is "in style". He has understood the preferences of individuals in the bandwagon horde and now he can improve his position within the group by purchasing more expensive units of the given luxury good. He can thus elevate his status above that of those members of the horde who do not belong to the preferred social group. The aggregation of the individual demand curves for the bandwagon case, which is sensitive to rising quantities of a good and not sensitive to price, as well as the aggregation of the individual demand curves for the Veblen-effect-case, which is sensitive to rising prices, can, therefore, be linked in an additive way, resulting in a market demand curve. This market demand for diamonds rises in an upward curve, depending on rising prices and quantities offered. The incline of the total demand curve depends on the price-quantity elasticity caused by Veblen's price-effect in respect of the pure quantityelasticity caused by the bandwagon effect, or in the "realprice (because of growing wealth)"-quantity elasticity, respectively. However, both effects show a common result, invariant to the tangible elasticity of the effects: in time prices will rise due to growing demand, even if the quantity offered is absorbable by a rising level of wealth indicating individual purchase power. 9 The rising level of wealth is, therefore, a central element. Rising prices of diamonds in regard to the Veblen-effect as well as demand for greater quantities of diamonds as a result of the band-wagon-effect can be financed by the members of a prospering society in which income and wealth rise more quickly than the demand for essentials. Now we shall try to explain why De Beers, who for a long time as the worldwide diamond monopoly and later the "strong hand" of the worldwide diamond cartel, is able to create a slow but steady growth in gemstone diamond prices in spite of a steadily growing supply. 
Pricing on Partial Markets
The cartel organised by De Beers sets the monopoly price for the commodity, allocates the monopoly output among the member companies, and determines how the monopoly profits are to be shared. Therefore, De Beers 9 Braun, H. (2004), pp. 170-171. 10 An empirical, and similar discussion is presented by In December, Diamonds are Forever: Empirical evidence of counter-cyclical pricing in a durable goods market maintains full vertical control of the production and the distribution. For the examination of the price-setting mechanism on the diamond market, we will have to consider the objective of constantly rising prices over a period of time.
11 As De Beers controls all sales activities, De Beers is able to establish different prices. Therefore, De Beers controls the market supply by making different types of diamonds available to consumers. In order to be able to practise first-degree price discrimination, the monopolist is supposed to know the exact shape of each consumer's demand curve and be able to charge the highest price that each consumer would pay for each unit of the product. It must be impossible for the consumers from the low-price market to resell on the high-price partial market, as such arbitrary dealings would lead to a collapse.
The analysis of the existing gemstone diamond market reveals a lack of horizontal price differentiation in terms of the fact that the price of a gemstone diamond of a given size and quality is different for different geographically separate markets. The vertical price differentiation in terms of charging different prices for different gemstone diamond qualities is the only important assumption taken for the purpose of the above model. 11 Referring empirical pricing, look at Yoeli: http://home.uchicago.edu/~eyolie/EY_thesis.pdf. Regarding the real sales system with its variety of different diamond qualities and pricing possibilities, it can be assumed that the diamond market consists of a large number of small partial markets. In order to be able to abstract the activities and for modeling purposes we will consider a monopoly divided into two partial markets. The profit and marginal profit functions for both markets of the classical monopolistic firm are: The total market revenue function of the price differentiating monopoly is:
By differentiating partially and setting equal to zero, we obtain the first-order constraint: 
This means that the marginal profits on every partial market must be equal, the sum being equal to the marginal cost of the total market. This implies that the monopolist has to set different prices on each partial market. The prices on the partial markets would be equal only if the elasticity of the demand is identical. The addition of both would result in a kinked aggregated monopoly demand curve and the monopolist would choose C as the optimal point with price p and quantity y.
This amount is divided into the partial markets at 1 y and 2 y , implying that the marginal profits in market 2 are higher than in market 1. The monopolist will thus lower the quantity available in market 1 and raise the quantity in market 2 until the marginal costs are equal. Now we have to analyse the monopolist's negatively sloped demand curve for a partial market. The results can easily be applied to every other existing partial market and will then be aggregated to a total market demand curve. A classic monopolist must lower the price of the and we furthermore assume that commodity in order to sell more of it. Thus the marginal revenue curve lies below his demand curve. De Beers, however, has periodically to take into consideration the illusion of value. In terms of the consumers' expectations and the monopolist's fundamental strategy of forcing the price level constantly upward, the monopolist will diverge in the short term from the classic monopoly theory and set a demand curve that possibly does not maximise profits (optimal MR), even if demand slacks off. This occasional action, even if generating negative profits, allows one to fulfill consumers' expectations regarding price expectations and the future increasing value of the commodity, which is the main task of the monopolist. The growing supply of the commodity forces the monopolist to adopt a strategy in order to be able to enlarge the market demand and to offer an increasing quantity of the product over a period of time.
As the price of the commodity has to rise in the following period and the market demand has to increase at the same time, the monopolist will consequently set the new demand curve for the period 1 t slightly flatter than in the period 0 t . He is now able to charge a higher price 1 p at a higher level of demand 1 y . In the period 2 t the monopolist will start at the price level 1 p from the last period and set a new demand curve for the period 2 t , which now has to be somewhat flatter than in the period 1 t . Again the new price 2 p for the period 2 t will be higher than 1 p and the level of demand 2 y will be higher than 1 y .
The market operator analysed here can and will set the monopolistic demand curve to follow his constraints and his long-term strategy, since as a monopolist he has on the one hand total vertical market power and the ability to control all trading situations, and on the other hand perfect knowledge of present and future consumer demand.
Aggregated Upward-sloping Demand Curve and Price Restrictions
The periodical view of the monopolistic demand curve leads us directly to the construction of the aggregated demand curve over time. The monopolist chooses one price n p and the corresponding quantity n y for the period n t . Thus the price-quantity-combination is realised and fixed. In order to analyse the long-term impact on the market, we look at the aggregated demand curve over n periods. It can be seen that this curve is identical to the curve of the Veblen-effect, but now a price-quantity combination is defined over time and not over the demand curves of different consumers as with conspicuous consumption. In addition, the demand curve here is identical to the supply curve of the monopolistic firm. The aggregation of all price-quantity combinations results in an upward sloping aggregated demand curve, which corresponds to the empirical analysis of aggregated demand in the past. By setting his demand curve for a partial market periodically, the monopolist manages to constantly raise prices and at the same time enlarge the market demand in the long term. The monopolist, however, faces important restrictions and constraints regarding opportunities to set the future demand curve for the period This might have a short-term positive effect, but with regard to the long term the decrease in the commodity's price will destroy consumers' expectations and destroy any illusion of value. Furthermore, price cuts will affect the Veblen-benefit of conspicuous consumption, particularly through an increase in demand. The monopolist will lose his reputation of being able to ensure steadily increasing prices and will in the long term therefore lose all his market power. After this analysis of a lower price limit we shall explore the case of an upper price limit and its consequences. Increasing the price in the period 1 + n t above the level of max 1 + n p would lead to a short-term decrease in demand, forcing the monopolist to operate below his optimal MR rate and intersect with the expanding demand strategy. On the other hand, as implied by the effects discussed above, the relatively high price of a commodity will lead to bandwagon and Veblen-effects and cause an increase of consumer demand in the future. The risk of speculative bubbles 14 becomes inherent and the monopolist will face an uncontrollable threat to his market. Again, he will lose his reputation, which in the long term leads to the loss of all market power and thus to a market collapse. In terms of price setting strategies, the monopolist has to act carefully within narrow limits ( illusion of value and lose his reputation. By acting within the described limits the monopolist will effect a constant and slow long-term increase of price levels. 15 This strategy is the only way to prevent a market collapse caused either by negative consumer expectation or by speculative bubbles.
The analysis used so far has considered the periodic linear monopolistic demand curve for a partial market. Now the partial market's demand curves will be added to an aggregated periodic curve in order to obtain the monopolist's total market demand curve. In order to abstract the diamond market with its very high number of partial markets it is necessary to analyse a simplified model with four partial markets, which have been specially selected for modeling purposes. The horizontal addition of the four partial-market demand curves results in a kinked total market demand curve, whereby the marginal revenue has a jump discontinuity If we now regard a large number of partial markets instead of the four analysed partial markets, and the associated total market demand curve, we obtain a convex downward sloping price-quantity relation, similar to the classic theoretical monopolistic market demand curve as is common in any microeconomic analysis. The Marginal Revenue curve MR will also be downward sloping and convex and the jump discontinuities seen in the four-markets case will disappear in the case of an infinite number of partial markets. 15 The constraints imposed by the vertical axis (regarding price p and MR) and the horizontal axis (regarding quantity y) are not important. 16 Schumann/Meyer/Ströbele (1999), p. 286.
How the Monopoly Could be Threatened by Aggressors
Monopoly power would be a purely short-term phenomenon if there were no barriers to prevent entry into the industry. When the monopolist sets his price above the competitive level and restricts output in order to maximise profits, the excess profits can create incentives for competitors to enter the market.
17
Although the monopolist has installed highly effective tools of market demand and supply control, gemstones do have, however, one attribute the monopolist cannot control: since a diamond is a natural product, there is a high probability that in the future new supplies of the commodity will be found and exploited; and thus the monopolist does not know whether other potentially competitive producers will try to enter into the market 18 . While the analysis so far has used the static equilibrium theory, the change over time still has to be discussed. While there may be a monopoly market in one period, new competitors can arise in the following period, offering similar products at lower prices and causing a transformation of the market into an oligopoly market.
19
Let us suppose that new deposits of gemstone diamonds were found, new diamond mines were opened and the new, aggressive, competitor would refuse to accept and collude with the De Beers cartel. Let us then suppose that a new aggressor enters the market, who is approximately the same size as the monopolist. He thus has more or less unlimited financial capability, possesses a large stockpile of the commodity in question and faces the same political, juridical and environmental constraints as the monopolist. The aggressor's goods in stock and in actual production are assumed to be normally distributed and perfectly differentiated, just as the monopolist's commodities are. This means that the competitor will not restrict his attack to a single partial market but will attempt to hit the monopolist simultaneously in all partial markets, i.e. the total market. We assume that the consumers are indifferent to the product supplier as the products have the same quality, size and appearance, i.e. they do not have preferences for any particular supplier. 
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possess an identical commodity with no restrictions on capacity.
It is, however, very difficult for the outsider to determine the output of the monopolist, as sales figures and sales information might be unavailable. It would thus be better to use the market price as the deciding factor, since price information is usually publicly available. The model governing this case is known as "Bertrand competition" 21 and assumes that the firms involved do set their prices and let the market demand determine the quantity sold. The company 2 C has to forecast and determine the price set by the former monopolist in the market. Varian assumes that market prices have to be higher than marginal cost (if MC are higher than p, the firm would increase profits by producing less) and the companies are selling identical commodities. C . The next step will be a price cut by company 1 C , followed by alternating price reduction sequences which lead to the "Nash-Bertrand equilibrium". 23 Varian notes that any price higher than the marginal cost rate cannot be in 21 Bertrand, J. (1883) equilibrium on the market, and that the only steady equilibrium is the competitive one.
24
With regard to the total diamond market, the aggressor will offer all diamonds at a lower price level than the former monopolist, and as a consequence, consumers will now purchase from the aggressor. This leads to a price cut of De Beers on the total market, forcing the aggressor into alternating price reduction sequences to the marginal cost level.
The Bertrand model is based on the assumption that the marginal cost structures of the two competitors are identical which, however, might in reality not be true. This would be the case if at least one of the firms, in the analysed period n, were to reach its production capacity With regard to the gemstone market, in the analysis it has already been assumed that an unrestricted competitor faces no capacity limits as he has at his disposal huge stockpiles of the commodity and is thus always able to offer the demanded quantity.
The company with a lower marginal cost rate MC would be able to push the second company out of the market if it faced no production capacity restrictions and applied an appropriate pricing policy. Let us now consider the gemstone diamond market with two competitors. It is very likely that they both have different cost structures 26 with regard to only the pure periodical production of the commodity. But the maximum demanded quantity for the period n, in which the attack takes place, can easily be supplied using the existing stockpiles. In addition the competitors have enough goods in stock to supply any periods x n + , so that we can assume for our model a rate of marginal costs of practically zero and thus conclude that both competitors will remain in the market selling at a competitive price.
Such an attack by an equally powerful aggressor might be able to make the market collapse, since a price cut from the monopoly price level to the competitive price level will destroy the attained illusion of value and scarcity of gemstone diamonds. This will lead to a market collapse because of the negative expectations of 24 Varian, H. R. (1990) , pp. 461-462. 25 Schumann/Meyer/Ströbele (1999), pp. 350-351. 26 Without using empirical data, it can be assumed that two multinational "global player" companies with different production plants face different cost structures and thus have different marginal cost rates, caused by legislation, geographical, social factors etc.
consumers. In the De Beers case, the large stockpile causes very low marginal costs and thus leaves De Beers as the former monopolist, as well as the unrestricted competitor acting in the duopoly market with almost zero profits. We assume now that one of the market actors continues a "price war". This will lead in the long term to negative profits and destroy the gemstone diamond market. Due to the very delicate market actions taken by De Beers in order to control consumer demand, the illusion of value will break down instantly, forcing consumers to leave the market and perhaps look for other substitutes.
If an unrestricted outsider, who is now assumed to be an equal competitor, enters the market, refuses to cooperate with the monopolist by entering the cartel and attacks the monopoly on the total market, this will cause the breakdown of the market. In terms of the classical monopoly theory, there would be no problem, as the outsider would achieve profits equalling marginal costs, and would thus simply lose any surplus profits he would have achieved inside the cartel. The theoretical monopolistic market would switch to become a competitive market, attracting more and more dealers. The diamond market works mainly because of the consumers' expectations of future price stability, and therefore a price cut to competitive price levels will not leave the outsider with profits equalling marginal costs but will cause negative profits leading to the market exit of both the unrestricted outsider and the De Beers monopolist. The only possible solution for the unrestricted outsider would be to join the cartel and to collude with the monopolist.
Emergence of a Secondary Market for SecondHand Diamonds as a Fundamental Attack
The rise of an uncontrolled secondary market of gemstone quality diamonds would be the most important threat to the monopoly. 27 In order to control the "actors" of the market and the diamond supply, De Beers installed an efficient market control mechanism. But how could they prevent consumers from reselling their diamonds, which, in terms of microeconomic theory, would lead to important price cuts to the competitive price level and in consequence to a market collapse? It has been already stated that De Beers controls the vertical sales and supply chain, from the working of its own or the cartel's mines to the wholesaling sightholder and, therefore, to the smallest jeweler. However, it is obvious that there will be attempts to suppress diamond dealing outside the cartel. The monopolist will use his market power to prevent consumers establishing a secondary market, in addition to any commercial outsider-firm. History has taught us that jewelers will not pay the market price of a "new" diamond to a customer who wants to resell his "used" diamonds. Instead he will be offered a much lower price.
28
But the gemstone diamond is a long-term durable commodity facing no kind of technical abrasion or depreciation within a given time. Compared to durable commodities where a functioning second-hand market operates, there are no quality differences between a "new" and a "used" diamond. This implies that any "used" diamond is supposed to have the same attributes as a new one. Hence, the "used" diamond is a perfect substitute for a new one as long as no other restrictions, e.g. emotional ones, are given. If a "used" diamond from a private stockpile enters the market, consumers can be assumed to be indifferent to the choice of product. But this plausible assumption gives any second-hand diamond supplier an "aggressor's" position, just like an emerging external producer. If the number of (private) second-hand diamond suppliers is adequately large, these suppliers may act as a very huge outsider, who is uncontrollable due to the vast amount of independent, individual decisions on the market. The quantities accumulated over past decades or even centuries and now held in private stock are subject to an analysis of the emergence of an uncontrolled secondary gemstone diamonds market.
Let us suppose that a certain proportion of the diamonds never enters the market again for various reasons, for example, if the commodity is being used as a personal, emotional gift. 29 In this case a high social or 28 According to Fuchs, price offers were at maximum one third of the market value.Fuchs, A. (1997), pp. 8-9. The low offered price level for "used" diamonds applies only if consumers attempt to make cash. If an end-consumer wishes to buy a new, bigger diamond, he is offered the intrinsic value equalling the market price. By this, De Beers even manages to perpetuate the illusion of value. It can be assumed that the huge number of different diamond quality classes makes it almost impossible for the consumer to determine the fair value of his gemstone diamond, and thus the creation of a second-hand market can be avoided. Braun, H. (2004), p. 180. This problem occurs even if any reliable certifications of the physical attributes of any gemstone diamond do exist. The certification qualifies the "4-C" (carat, cut, colour, clarity) only and not the price associated with the certified bundle of quality-dimensions. Because almost every diamond is unique, a representative "market-price" could be not given exactly. 29 For cardinal versus ordinal quality of goods see Kamenica, E. (2008):
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A Simple Microeconomic Model Illustrating Rising Diamond Prices and the Durable Goods Problem psychological entry barrier does exist, i.e. a proportion of consumers will never be willing to sell diamonds from their family estate. 30 But whereas the monopolistic market is entirely controlled by one company, which also has perfect controlling mechanisms for its distribution channels, the occurrence of a "used" diamonds secondary market would impose a series of problems. It would hardly be possible to control the sales on an emerging secondary market, especially with regard to new distribution methods, such as internet auctions, etc.. Let us assume now that consumers want to realise the increase in value of the commodity as generated by De Beers' illusion of value in cash. In that case a huge number of participants would enter the market, equipped with an almost infinite quantity of diamonds and a marginal cost rate MC of almost zero. This rate of marginal costs can be assumed to be zero, since we can suppose that the consumer as a seller now is not obliged to mine for the goods, nor does he have expensive stockpiling costs, but rather he holds the commodity ready for sale in what were formerly "safe hands", e.g. the family's estate.
Let us suppose that a large number of consumers will enter the market and that they offer a high number of stones of various different qualities and cuts. This implies that the privately held stockpile accumulated over decades or even centuries is a perfectly differentiated supply in regard to the size and the quality of the diamonds now privately offered. For the purpose of our model, it might be interesting to assume that all the small, private suppliers use, for example, a single trading platform outside the monopolistic organised cartel. Thus they act like a huge unrestricted outsider with unlimited stockpiles, threatening the monopoly. Thus the secondary market itself, as long as it does not collude with the cartel, acts like an unrestricted outsider because De Beers will not be able to "punish" the secondary market or force it to trade within the cartel. We previously discussed the market impact of such an attack with respect to an outsider of approximately the same size as the monopolist. The secondary market, as regards the attack on the monopolistic market, can be seen as far bigger, thus forcing the monopolist to the competitive price level in a very short time. In view of the fact that the complete financial and product resources of the secondary market must be far higher than De Beers's resources, it can be concluded that De Beers as the former unrestricted and powerful monopolist will switch now into the position of a restricted and limited potential competitor in terms of financial resources and production capacities. The strategies discussed above of enlarging the produced amount or the buy-back actions cannot work from the moment when the secondary market emerges 31 . This will force De Beers into the position of the restricted outsider who must either cooperate with the secondary market or be pushed outside the market. As a consequence, cooperation implies a drop in the former monopolistic price of gemstone diamonds to a new competitive price level equalling Marginal Cost and thus being almost zero -as it is the valid bottom price for the private sales on the secondary market under total competition.
If the monopolist gives up his value-illusion strategy and consumers expect a drop in price, they will try to sell their commodities as quickly as possible and thus enter the secondary market as soon as possible. The De Beers monopolist will hardly be in a position to buy all gemstone diamonds offered on the increasing secondary market in order to maintain control of it, as he will face financial limits of his own. Hence the monopolist will be obliged to lower prices in order that sales do not stop entirely and, therefore, the price of the commodity will fall to the competitive price level equalling the marginal cost rate MC, in our case zero, which leads to a total market collapse. Hence the illusion of value and scarcity of gemstone diamonds -as a Veblen commodity as well as an asset -is destroyed.
Rational Consumer Expectations and the Case of the Coase Conjecture: the Durable Goods Monopolist Becomes his Own Rival
In order to explain the marketing strategy of the durable goods monopolist, it is important to analyse consumer behavior. As the value-consistent strategy of keeping prices rising continually − if slowly − depends on consumer participation with respect to future prices, the 31 Assuming that the accumulated amounts of gemstone diamonds in private hands and the financial power of all end-consumers are added together, it is useful for the modelling purposes to suppose infinite stocks and financial power. monopolist will be forced to fulfill rational consumer expectations in order not to cause a lethal market collapse.
In an equilibrium situation for rational expectations, the monopolist is maximising profits, given the correctly perceived expectations of consumers who are rightly expecting that the monopolist will behave in this manner in every contingency. That means that each side of the market constructs correct expectations about how the other would behave in any situation, even in situations that may never actually occur. 32 For our model of the gemstone diamond market we assume that there are no production costs and no capacity constraints. In addition the product does not depreciate and retains all its qualities. In such a case Stokey assumes that there is an inverse demand function for the services of the commodity, the monopolist uses an infinite planning horizon, and the total stock of the goods in the hands of consumers − the potential players on a secondary market − is viewed as the situation variable of the model. At each date, consumers form expectations about the total stock of the commodity that will have been sold by each date in the infinite future. 33 Furthermore, Stokey assumes that the monopolist knows the function which describes how the endconsumers' expectations are formed. Given this function, he chooses a sales strategy that maximises the present discounted value of its future profit stream. If this sales strategy fulfils the end-consumers' expectations, the result is a rational expectations equilibrium. Given any continuous, increasing path for the stock satisfying appropriate margin conditions, an expectation function can be constructed that constitutes a rational equilibrium. Furthermore, the function constructed shows that the consumers' expectations depend continuously on the current stock. This shows De Beers's dilemma, since De Beers has to keep huge quantities of diamonds in stock in order to be able to interact in the case of an attack by an outside producer. With their stockpiling policy De Beers are balancing on a knife's edge. Even if continuity of the expectation function is required, the assumption that expectations are fulfilled has no implications for the observed path of sales.
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In the case of a product giving rise to goodwill or, in the present case, to a reputation for the main seller on the market, the monopolist might take a dynamic view and 32 Stokey, N. L. (1982), pp. 112-113. 33 Kamenica assumes that consumers can assess the ordinal but not cardinal quality of products. Kamenica, E. (2008 Kamenica, E. ( ), pp. 2127 Kamenica, E. ( -2249 Stokey, N. L. (1982), p. 114. sacrifice current positive revenues in order to improve future profits. In a durable goods market there is an intertemporal link on the demand side, which is associated with the durability of goods held by the consumers. Assuming that the lifetime of a commodity exceeds a socalled basic period indicating the length of time between price revisions 35 , the goods offered by the monopolist in two different periods are "substitutes rather than complements"
36
. A customer who buys a durable article today is unlikely to purchase the same commodity in the following period since the commodity does not depreciate. The dynamic theory of monopoly behaviour must take into account the fact that the market players cannot sign contracts to guarantee that the future price levels of their product will be above a certain level. If a commitment to future prices were possible, the time path of prices would usually not be the one which brought a demand which could maximise the discounted stream of revenues minus costs. 37 The conditions for a dynamically consistent consumption plan are correct price anticipation of consumers and no possibility of the monopolist deviating from the price path expected by the consumers in order to increase the expected present value of his remaining profit.
38
Coase developed a model for a monopolist who sells a durable commodity. 39 Coase assumes that a seller facing one potential consumer with private information about his valuation cannot extract more than his own reserve value. This holds true, as the seller is unable to credibly commit to not lowering his price in subsequent periods if his previous offers were rejected. As this is rationally anticipated, even a buyer with a very high valuation is better off by initially rejecting a high price if the loss from delaying his purchase becomes sufficiently small. 
